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Abstract
This article analyses the mainstream press coverage of the terror in Norway 
post 22.07.2011 and discusses how and in what context the concepts of 
freedom of expression and multiculturalism occur. The aim has been to map 
important discursive trends in the aftermath of the terror. A clear division 
between different victim positions is identified. One blames majority society for 
not granting enough space to extreme right wing views on Islam and diversity/
multiculturalism; another one sees the terror connected to a majority society 
that already has demonstrated a high degree of hostility towards migrants 
and Muslims. Thus, two different understandings of the status for freedom of 
expression in Norway occur, linked to differing positions on the diversity society.
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1    Introduction: contested concepts
In the first weeks after the 22.7.2011 terror attacks, politicians, the 
clergy and the royal family stated the need for more openness and 
democracy. A “positive cohesion” of sorts occurred as Norway’s 
immediate response to the terror. But a “negative cohesion” also 
emerged, especially in some of the social media, where the terrorist’s 
extremist and hateful views found some support. Another negative 
reaction was registered in the first few hours after the attack on the 
government buildings, as some “migrant-looking individuals” were 
subjected to hateful comments and physical attacks in the hours 
before the public learned that the terrorist was a blonde, ethnic 
Norwegian (Harr & Partapuoli 2012). These initial reactions indicate 
that if the terrorist had been Norway-born Ahmed, the political and 
discursive situation would have developed differently.
The Norwegian media coverage post 22 July 2011 was massive, 
as was the coverage of the court proceedings in the late spring of 
2012 and the report from the commission that found the Norwegian 
vigilance toward terrorism suffering from many shortcomings.2 In 
August 2012, Anders Behring Breivik was sentenced to maximum 
imprisonment after being found accountable for his acts of terror and 
thus not insane. He did not appeal.
Our analysis includes the first 100 days of coverage, and the 
analysis is based on the following research questions, developed 
from initial studies of the whole press coverage, where an impression 
was that the volume of issues related to freedom of expression 
and multiculturalism had increased substantially from its normal 
proportion. Our article investigates the following questions: 
• Which main discourses may be identified in news coverage 
and opinion material focusing on “freedom of expression” and 
“multiculturalism” during the first 100 days of national press 
coverage post-22 July?
•  Which genres were the most frequent, and what kind of people 
were allowed to speak (as sources) of these topics in the national 
mainstream media?
The article first provides some theoretical discussion of the two 
terms in question, secondly outlines our methodological approach 
before presenting the results of our discourse analysis of items 
covering “freedom of expression” and “multiculturalism”. The 
conclusion discusses these results as a symptom of the public 
sphere debates in Norway post 22 July. As shown in Table 1, the 
press material in this period was large, albeit diminishing from the 
first intensive weeks after the mass killings.
A preliminary analysis of the press coverage after the terrorist 
acts indicated that freedom of expression was an important issue in 
the debate, at times mentioned as part of a presupposed causality 
chain. Furthermore, multiculturalism (for ABB synonymous with 
“cultural Marxism”), suggested by the terrorist as a main motivation 
for his attacks, also came to be debated with increasing frequency 
post-22 July, both as a phenomenon worthy of more debate and as a 
scapegoat of sorts (Eide 2012b).
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1.1    Freedom of expression
Despite the fact that freedom of expression is founded in the 
Norwegian constitution (Article 100), as well as being a fundamental 
human right according to international law and the UN declaration of 
rights (Article 19), not all expressions are considered legal. According 
to the Norwegian Criminal Code, incitement to violence is illegal, and 
Article 135A (the so-called “racism article”) in the punitive law rules 
against discrimination.3 Article 142 on blasphemy in the punitive 
law has long been dormant and the Norwegian Parliament in 2009 
voted for it to be removed, but the decision has still not been put into 
practice.
Freedom of expression became a transnationally contested area 
in the wake of the cartoon controversy occurring after the Danish 
newspaper Jyllands-Posten published 12 cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohammad, in August 2005. Various interpretations of the freedom 
of expression occurred in media across the world. The media 
coverage not only confirmed an existing discourse of blame against 
Muslims that had increased post-9/11 2001 but also brought forward 
an increased global dialogue and debate on the issue (see Eide, 
Kunelius & Phillips 2008; Rose 2010; Stage 2011).
 From the ensuing press practices and debates, several attitudes 
towards freedom of expression were identified. One promotes an 
“absolute freedom” or “liberal fundamentalism” seeing no limits to 
this freedom, and viewing eventual insults as educative towards 
the insulted, since they (in this case Muslims) need to learn to “live 
with Western values”. As may be seen from the 22 July debates, 
this direction also argues that the best way to combat extremism 
is to open up for all kinds of extreme views, even if they may be 
considered racist or insulting. Another direction emphasises 
tolerance, i.e. practicing “freedom with responsibility” or “liberal 
pragmatism”, taking other people’s sensitivities into consideration, 
but still defending the right to full freedom of expression. A third 
dimension, “dialogical multiculturalism” may not fully support the 
right to provoke, as it believes dialogue to be more instrumental in 
promoting understanding among people, and it may also share a 
critique of modernity and “western double standards” with the last 
tendency, “religious or ethnic fundamentalism”, often occurring as a 
reaction to liberal attitudes. This stream is supportive of blasphemy 
legislation (for a more elaborate explanation of these tendencies, see 
Kunelius & Eide 2007).
Heightened discussion on the issue occurred during the 
cartoon controversy in Norway, especially from January 2006 after 
a Norwegian weekly newspaper published the same cartoons. The 
discussion was intensified anew after an attempt on cartoonist Kurt 
Westergaard’s life in January 2010. Several Norwegian newspapers 
reacted by republishing the Mohammed cartoons, to underline the 
principle of free expression and express their solidarity with the victim 
(cf. Aftenposten 8.01.2010).
Judging from these trends in the Norwegian debate, the first two 
tendencies mentioned above seem to be the most relevant for our 
analysis. This is also supported by Stage’s observations on perceived 
threats in the Danish debate. He suggests that the main division 
occurred between “articulations, which focus on threatened freedom 
of expression and threatened tolerance respectively as the crux of 
the matter” (Stage 2011 38). Expressions may represent an ethical 
problem, even if they do not abuse a certain right guaranteed by law. 
“One may thus operate within ethical ideals for communication in a 
democratic society, that are not necessarily grounded in legislation” 
(O’Neill in Stage 2011:39). Put more simply, the two main positions 
in the Norwegian debates seem to have been between emphasis on 
communicative rights and communication based on responsibility as 
the fundament of democracy.
Another aspect of the debate has to do with the distinction 
between freedom of expression and freedom of the press. There is 
a need to distinguish between media with editorial guidelines and, 
for example, unedited blogs (Steel 2012). ABB did not figure in 
the mainstream press, but was for a while an active participant at 
the document.no website, one of the main websites critical/hostile 
to Islam in Norway, with a considerable number of visitors (for a 
detailed analysis of the blog entries of the terrorist on Document.
no, see Eide 2012b). Document.no consistently presents itself as a 
journalistic endeavor,4 while it may simultaneously be considered as 
an “echo chamber”, i.e. a forum where agreement overwhelmingly 
outnumbers disagreement both in entries and in comments to the 
entries. Thus, agreements on certain viewpoints are reinforced 
(Gilbert, Bergstrom & Karahalios 2009). Such chambers may occur 
both linked to racist subgroups, but diasporic groups may also look 
for recognition in popular and social media outside the mainstream 
media (Bangstad & Vetlesen 2011; Cunningham 2001). A recent 
example demonstrates that Norwegian law does distinguish between 
mainstream print media and, for example, blogs when it comes to 
Table 1. All national press, printed issues. Search string “22 July”: 23.7.2011 to 31.10.2011, totally 4,273 items. A search for “Anders Behring Breivik” 
generated 1,935 items in the same period. Source: Retriever search engine. The vertical dimension shows the number of articles and the horizontal 
one the week number in 2011.
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what is considered publishable. The government has suggested 
new and updated legislation to treat utterances on the Internet in the 
same manner as those occurring in mainstream media.5
The post 22 July period has seen a renewed debate on freedom 
of expression in Norway, where claims of this freedom having doxic 
proportions in Norway and thus leading to less vigilance against 
racist discrimination meet with questions of who should in a given 
situation define, for example, vulnerable minority status (Bangstad & 
Vetlesen 2011; Rønning & Wessel-Aas 2012).
1.2    Multiculturalism: a polysemic term
Multiculturalism has in recent years been subject to scholarly scrutiny 
linked to debates on migration policy (see Lentin & Titley 2011; 
Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010; Silj 2010). Questions concerning the 
term’s multiplicity of meanings have distinguished (at least) three 
varieties. First, multiculturalism is often used as a descriptive term 
– of a society in which a diversity of people of various national and 
cultural backgrounds co-exists and interact, i.e. multiculturalism as 
lived diversity. Descriptions are rarely innocent, thus lived diversity 
may be split into “good” and “bad” diversity, depending on who 
defines and describes it. As such, the concept has been used in 
the press to highlight successful integration (see Eide 2012a); or 
to represent problems occurring in diversified neighbourhoods in 
political discourses, where the “failure” of multiculturalism seems 
to occur with increasing frequency. “Rejecting multiculturalism has 
become the proxy for the rejection of lived multiculture, the alibi of 
experimental failure justifies the ordering of good and bad diversity” 
(Lentin & Titley 2011: 18). For the terrorist and his ideological 
supporters, diversity is fundamentally bad.
Second, multiculturalism can be seen as governance, as 
“diversity management”; and [thus] as a politics for guaranteeing 
minority rights. Kymlicka describes how a policy of inclusion 
developed in Canada, starting with the indigenous people, then 
taking up the rights of the linguistic minorities and furthermore 
in recent times, the new immigrants. He calls this a process of 
“citizenization” (Kymlicka 2010: 43–47). As Lentin and Titley suggest, 
for “racialized minorities, multiculturalism – as governance, and as 
broad coagulation of public values and aspirations – has, to varying 
degrees, made many societies nicer and fairer places to live than 
their historical antecedents” (Lentin & Titley 2011: 14).
Third, multiculturalism may be seen as ideology or philosophy. 
This definition refers particularly to the -ism part of the concept and 
has been interpreted in several ways. On one hand, multiculturalism 
is associated with an exaggerated and dangerously naïve cultural 
relativism, allowing practices breaking with human rights values (or 
just allowing too many immigrants, especially Muslims), based on 
group rights. On the other hand, it may be seen as a celebration 
of co-existence between different people, including respect and 
acceptance of deviance – within the limits of the law and human 
rights principles.
The boundaries between the definitions of multiculturalism are 
porous. Descriptive multiculturalism may, for example, be strongly 
or less strongly rooted in ideology; the policy definition(s) likewise, 
since one can distinguish varieties of diversity appreciation from 
different political actors. All the same, the variety of approaches to 
multiculturalism demonstrates clearly that the concept belongs to a 
contested discursive area, or as Stuart Hall describes, a “maddeningly 
spongy and imprecise discursive field” (in Lentin & Titley 2011, 12). 
Thus, expressions of multiculturalism as a scapegoat for the “failures” 
of late modern Europe, leaning on specially tailored definitions, are 
likely to occur also in the years to come.
2    Methodology
As a basis for this article, we mapped the 22 July coverage in 
the national printed press for the first 100 days, by combining the 
search strings “22 July” with either “freedom of expression” or with 
“multiculturalism” and thus generated a total of 325 items (155 and 
170, respectively). This was done by using the Atekst/Retriever 
archive. The research questions have been mentioned above. Some 
articles, after a closer scrutiny had to be left out as unrelated to the 
issues sought for. There may also be a few articles not occurring, due 
to technical flaws in the archive systems, but usually this is not an 
important problem. We still consider our sample to be representative 
of what was written in the national printed press on our selected 
topics during the first 100 days after 22 July 2011.
Our first work was quantitative, coding each issue by categories, 
such as date, medium, genre, size, source’s voice (position and 
gender, however, not including the journalist, unless in signed 
opinion items). At times, the boundaries between different journalistic 
and opinionated genres are difficult to maintain. While we were 
focusing on the mainstream press, we registered how these media 
increasingly cite tweets and blog entries as part of an adaptation 
strategy in turbulent times for “traditional media”, and thus our 
categorisation had to be adjusted.
Second, a careful reading of the sample, inspired by Critical 
discourse analysis, was necessary to distinguish important 
discourses. Here, the first analysis also went through a process of 
adjustment of terms, when discourses in different parts of the material 
seemed to be in confluence with each other. An in-depth study 
consisted of debates following two chronicles in Norway’s largest 
newspaper, Aftenposten, one having mostly to do with freedom of 
expression and the other mainly concerned with multiculturalism.
Critical discourse analysis is being used to distinguish patterns of 
dominant approaches to two challenging debates, which became 
prominent post-22 July. As Fairclough iterates: 
My view is that media discourse should be regarded as the 
site of complex and often contradictory processes, including 
ideological processes. Ideology should not be seen as a constant 
and predictable presence in all media discourse by definition. 
Rather, it should be a working principle that the question of what 
ideological work is being done is one of a number of questions 
which analysts should always be ready to ask of any media 
discourse, though they should expect the answers to be variable 
(Fairclough 1995: 47).
The emphasis of the variable is crucial here, as many participants 
do not necessarily clearly position themselves in public sphere 
debates. Exposing a variety of discourses allows us to come closer 
to an understanding of how the two selected terms are understood 
in relation to the terrorist attacks. Furthermore, critical discourse 
analysis may identify some current (political) trends when it comes 
to defining both free expression and multiculturalism, and what this 
entails for a Norwegian society recovering from terror.
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3    Discourses on freedom of expression
The search for items treating “freedom of expression” combined with 
“22 July” identified 155 articles, with a maximum of nine published 
on 7.08.2011. Two-thirds (67%) of the items are either letters to the 
editor, editorials or other opinionated articles, including chronicles. Of 
these, 55% are “external”, i.e. contributions from the readers.
Ethnic Norwegian men are overrepresented among the voices 
quoted (or contributors, including letters to the editor), with 63% of 
all voices cited, whereas 23% are ethnic Norwegian women. Ethnic 
minority individuals7 are represented in 6% of all voices (an equal 
share of men and women). This proportion is higher than the average 
number of ethnic minority voices represented in the Norwegian press 
where recent findings suggest only 2% (Retriever 2012).8 All in all, 
this coverage seems to be lesser dominated by elite sources than the 
one on multiculturalism (see below).
Few hours after the attack in Oslo, several mainstream 
newspapers closed their online debate forums, or restricted their 
availability, fearing hateful entries. Nevertheless, the debate on 
freedom of expression intensified and developed into a discussion 
on how to ensure a democratic debate. Aftenposten asked the 
Facebook followers 24.07.2011 a direct question: “How can we 
fight the ideology that Anders Behring Breivik is promoting?” One 
follower answered: “Newspapers must stop citing people like him.” 
Another follower: “Freedom of Speech and candour: Rip arguments 
and attitudes into pieces. Discuss them to death.” (Both printed in 
Aftenposten 25.07.2011). These answers correspond to the two 
currents that are found in the studied contributions post-22 July: The 
first wants media to ensure a respectful tone in the public sphere, 
whereas the latter emphasises that everything should be expressed 
in an attempt to sort out the arguments and reach a beneficial 
conclusion.
The salient hallmark of the latter is the comprehension of 
freedom of speech as (partly) abridged in Norway today. The 
adherents apprehend freedom of speech as absolute by nature. 
“In a free society somebody will always feel offended [by attendees 
in the debates][…] It is better to highlight the conflicts than to 
suppress them in the name of respect and tolerance” (Dagsavisen 
28.09.2011), writes Professor Helge Rønning. “To ‘blow out’ may 
rather relieve the pressure”, writes another researcher (Aftenposten 
30.07.2011). In the following, we shall call this the pressure cooker 
discourse. The supporters of this discourse advocate a society 
where even “unacceptable expressions” (including illegal ones), 
spiteful expressions on race and blasphemous utterances, should 
be “debated to death”. Defenders of this view refer to Prime Minister 
Jens Stoltenberg’s words “More openness and more democracy”. 
They criticise newspaper closure of debate forums in the aftermath 
of the tragedy. Two other participants write that “[…] to close and 
censor online forums and online communities is to create a less open 
and democratic society” (Aftenposten 5.08.2011). The discourse 
suggests that a democratic society requires an open arena for 
debates, and that some arguments are better than others; thus, one 
can obtain a true answer in the end. The pressure-cooker discourse 
finds the Norwegian debate too cramped. “It is always dangerous 
to gag those who resist a comprehension […] We must invite the 
terrorist and his fellows of opinion to a debate before they become 
murderers. In other words, I call for an end to political correctness”, 
writes yet another participant (Morgenbladet 29.07.2011).
A closer look at the contributors to the pressure cooker discourse 
reveals that these often voice critique of the newspapers for not 
having prioritised controversial opinions and the debates for being 
too “politically correct”, dominated by elites. “When they [the 
press] prevent this valve [controversial opinions] from functioning, 
they shouldn’t be surprised if it explodes in the end” (Aftenposten 
25.07.2011). This discourse also includes a critique of media for 
excluding certain groups: “I demand to hear the extremist voices, 
so that I can disapprove of them!” (Aftenposten 4.08.2011). Most 
contributors to this discourse seem to speak “on behalf of” extremists 
in the sense that they take their anger and general situation for 
granted. Furthermore they argue that a (non-extremist) “we” should 
speak out against “them” (the extremists). This leaves a paradox: 
What is criticised in this discourse? A debate dominated by elites. 
Who speaks about this elite dominance? Mainly the elite: politicians, 
journalists, writers and academics. One explanation may be that 
elite persons are encouraged by journalists and editors; they are 
interviewed, and oftentimes asked to participate in important debates.
“We should not let Breivik amplify the pressure toward censorship 
and conformity further.[…] Let us not give this type of terrifying 
expressions […] more traction”, writes one researcher (Aftenposten 
30.07.2011). This excerpt captures the very core of the pressure 
cooker discourse, as well as elaborating it further as a stand against 
indirect terrorist influence. Although the defenders of this discourse 
do not explicitly blame anyone but Breivik for the attacks, they 
implicitly suggest that restrictions on freedom of speech may be to 
Table 2. “22 Juli” AND “ytringsfrihet*”.6 Source: Retriever search engine, 23.7.2011 to 31.10.2011, all national newspapers. The vertical dimension shows 
                the number of articles, and the horizontal one the week number in 2011.
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blame for the tragedy. The underlying argument is that “we” raise 
extremists by refusing to listen to them.
The many contributors partly blaming lack of free expression for 
the terror somehow diminish the responsibility of the terrorist himself, 
his plans and deeds – and the diagnosis of Norwegian society’s 
degree of openness remains disputed. While defenders of the 
above-mentioned discourse assert that (a presupposed) censorship 
and self-censorship are constraining democracy, others claim 
that self-censorship or a degree of sensitivity is recommendable. 
This entails that showing respect for one’s fellow human beings in 
public debates is pivotal in a democracy.9 ”We are not talking about 
censorship of expressions, but about keeping the democratic debate 
to the point” (Dagbladet, 28.07.2011), writes one contributor. Within 
this discourse, supporters claim that sensitivity will preserve a public 
sphere with enlightened and fruitful discussions and emphasise 
that one is responsible for one’s own expressions. “Freedom of 
expression is not freedom from responsibility” (Vårt Land 4.08.2011), 
says a researcher interviewed. Proponents of these and related 
views adhere to what we have labelled the responsibility discourse.
Here it is argued that spiteful expressions can engender more 
hate. “A lot of people presume that spiteful expressions work as 
valves. […] But recent research has shown that hateful expressions 
lead to more hateful expressions”, writes another researcher 
(Dagbladet, 12.08.2011. A hallmark of the responsibility discourse is 
that writers refer to academic research, they are often themselves 
academics, or (to some extent) journalists. They argue that freedom 
of speech is not in any sense absolute. Some refer to law: “It may 
be time for Article §135a in the Punitive law to be tried by the 
system again. […] it is okay to make the Attorney General aware of 
expressions that cross the line”, writes a former Attorney General 
(Klassekampen 30.08.2011). “An aspiration to kill each other cannot 
be protected by freedom of expression” (VG 25.07.2011), writes a 
group from the Norwegian Centre against Racism.
A subsequent question within this discourse is whether debate 
forums on the Internet should be subjected to the same restrictions 
as newspapers. “The problem is the many extreme websites and 
comment spaces in the digital newspapers. […] These sites need to 
be cleaned up, not the regular debate in our society”, one professor 
argues (Morgenbladet 29.07.11). Contributors mention the Internet 
as a distinctive forum for spiteful expressions and also argue that the 
newspapers operating on the Internet and not least web publications 
such as document.no should exercise editorial responsibility:
[…] the editor’s responsibility entails one fundamentally positive 
factor: someone is seen as responsible […] The growth of the 
digital media the last fifteen years has in several ways undermined 
this principle […]pre-editing (which was always practiced before) 
is [at websites] by some almost considered as censorship, an 
attempt from the elites to reduce the common man’s freedom of 
expression” (Klassekampen 2.08.2011)
Moreover, debaters’ anonymity is questioned. “If you present a 
critique of a person or of a group that you do not feel like presenting 
face to face, maybe you should not have that [critique] printed” 
(Morgenbladet 9.09.11).
While the pressure cooker discourse presupposes a cramped 
Norwegian debate climate, the responsibility discourse to some 
extent blames a malicious and hateful debate culture for the attacks. 
What seems to connect the two discourses is that none of them 
consider the current Norwegian atmosphere for practicing freedom 
of speech as satisfactory, and to a degree they blame each other.
3.1    Unacceptable expressions?
The following is an analysis of some articles that occurred one 
month after the terror and the following days; they are selected 
since these items represent a rather principled debate on freedom 
of expression. It started with a chronicle in Norway’s largest 
newspaper (“Unacceptable expressions”, Aftenposten 22.08.2011). 
Four authors argued that during the last decade, the debate in 
Norway had been “particularly hateful”. They referred mostly not 
only to debates in the social media but also to mainstream media. 
As examples, they mentioned how Muslims in Norway had been 
called “quislings” and “Nazis” and been represented as a threat to 
“Norwegian values”. They wrote that freedom of expression is “not 
absolute” in any society – and addressed the relationship between 
speech and action: “To insist that there is an absolute division 
between words and deeds is accordingly to distance oneself from 
any moral responsibility for the reality that may emerge and has 
emerged from hateful expressions”.
This text doubts the assumption that the mass murderer would 
have refrained from his brutal deeds if he had had more access to 
mainstream media. As mentioned, ABB’s most frequent Norwegian 
media participation was on the web journal document.no. The editor 
of this journal in a later interview warns against linking words with 
deeds, while a critic of this editor says he (the editor) avoids deeper 
reflection on why ABB found a home on his website (Klassekampen 
11. 11.2011). The four authors argue against the document.no editor: 
“[…] it is likely that his understanding of reality has been strengthened 
by a public sphere where the limits towards hateful expressions have 
been stretched very much during the last decade”. Thus, they reject 
the pressure cooker discourse and instead suggest a discourse of 
freedom with responsibility, related to anti-racist discourse. They 
also appeal to editors and moderators to stand firm against hateful 
expressions and to “say that not all expressions should be attributed 
the same value”, thus shunning a relativist discourse claiming that all 
expressions are equally worthy of representation.
3.2    The right to offend
This item not only generated some debate in Aftenposten but 
also trickled into other parts of the mainstream press, as the four 
authors are high-profiled individuals in the Norwegian public sphere. 
A smaller opinionated article occurred a few days later, referring 
to Article 135A in the Norwegian punitive law, “which actually bans 
racist and discriminatory expressions. If punishable expressions 
have been published the last years, everyone should have taken 
the responsibility to report the issue” (Aftenposten 25.08.2011). This 
writer’s concern is that freedom of expression is about having an 
opinion in the public sphere even if it offends others.
The limits are among others drawn at incitement to violence, 
hatred and discrimination. That is punishable. […] The 
multicultural society creates tensions in all countries. The 
answer to the challenges facing us is not more surveillance and 
curbed freedom of expression, but to live with disagreement and 
tensions, keep our calm, preserve values, regulate anonymity 
and reject insensitivity using words as weapons (Aftenposten 
25.08.2011).
This comment may contain a concession to the four, although 
it is unclear what “regulate anonymity” entails. Another comment 
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reads: “If we had the same relaxed relation to the law when it comes 
to traffic rules as to the laws entitled to regulate discrimination in 
the public sphere, probably very few of us would dare to use our 
car” (Dagbladet, 31.08.2011). It is here suggested that a lack of 
application of Article 135A during recent years may be due to lack 
of confidence in the fruitfulness of issuing complaints, since they are 
mostly overruled by Article 100 in the constitution.
Another opinion piece was published the day after under the 
headline “Dangerous unclarity” (Aftenposten 26.08.2011), where 
Conservative Party MOP Michael Tetzschner questioned some 
of the conclusions in the initial article. “The underlying question is 
almost fully expressed in the critique of the Freedom of expression 
commission: How are “we”, the adult, grown-up, decent human 
beings going to limit the expressions of “the others”, the immature, 
the indecent.” Tetzschner furthermore criticises the four writers for 
promoting a caricature of free expression by stating that “every 
expression is given the same value”, since that entails having no 
values at all: “When good and bad ideas start, it is not because 
all should win, but so that the bad ones should be rejected” […] 
“The problem is not the socially unacceptable utterances, but 
what judicial limits that should constrain freedom of expression, in 
addition to norms for good behavior” (Aftenposten 26.08.2011). This 
writer suggests that by questioning whether it is a human right to 
express oneself in the public sphere, the four “downgrade freedom 
of expression as a value”, and suggests that free expression will be 
less important in the future.
3.3    Anti-elite discourses and victims
From Tetzschner’s arguments, we identify an anti-elitist discourse, 
blaming the four writers for situating themselves on a pedestal as 
“guardians” of the “less enlightened” (“immature”) ones. He fears 
curbs on free expression as a more imminent danger than streams of 
intolerance and racism.
One of the four originators of this debate promotes a different 
anti-elitist discourse. By writing about the traditionally vulnerable 
sections of society and referring to the Freedom of Expression 
commission and its leader (a well-known professor presumably 
belonging to the elite), the writer asks with what right this leader can 
identify what kind of expressions we “must tolerate”. Furthermore, he 
asks: “have those who never are subject to discrimination and abuse 
more rights than the ones who are [abused], to decide the limits of 
tolerance? Or should the authority be distributed in an opposite way, 
to the victims?” (Klassekampen 27.09.2011). Thus, the concern for 
vulnerable groups being subject to racist attacks is expressed.
These two anti-elitist discourses defend different non-elite 
rights: the victims of racism and discrimination – or the ones who 
harbour views that are not considered appropriate (racist, hostile 
to immigration or Islam). Both are supposedly overlooked by elite 
academics, editors and other members of the “chattering classes”.10 
This debate also highlights two different victim positions, which have 
competed for attention in the post 22 July debate. The victim – albeit 
traditionally considered to be without much political or cultural capital 
– may at times, if recognised by many, inherit a position of power 
fuelled by the victim status (Kapelrud 2008).
In Morgenbladet, a commentator refers to the original chronicle 
and represents the terrorist and his sympathisers, as follows:
The ones who now, at the kitchen tables outside of the official 
Norway, say that they “agree a little with Breivik”, do not of course 
agree with what he has done. But they share his feelings of being 
without representation in the public sphere. Much worse than if 
Breivik has misguidedly thought that he acted on behalf of many, 
it is if he really has experienced his situation the way he claims 
he has. This entails that he is pressurized beyond all reasonable 
limits, from a conformity that does not leave space for his deepest 
convictions. (Morgenbladet 9-15.09.2011) 
The above may be seen as a typical expression of the pressure 
cooker discourse. A different approach is made by one of the 
commentators in Dagsavisen. He writes that the Islam-sceptics 
represent the only group in the public debate, which has conquered 
the right to confuse opposition with gagging. “For years they have 
sulked about how impossible it is to debate immigration in this 
country while they have done so increasingly loud, on an increasing 
number of arenas and in a steadily harsher vocabulary” (Dagsavisen 
1.10.2011). And when the bomb exploded, the author concludes, the 
ones to blame were not those who spoke like him [the terrorist], but 
the ones who opposed such rhetoric.
4    Discourses on multiculturalism
When it comes to our search for combinations of “multiculturalism” 
and “22 July”, we find that articles written by editorial staff and non-
editorial sources are present in almost equal numbers. Editorial 
news, opinion articles and reportage represent 53% of the items. The 
balance between the editorial- and non-editorial sources indicates 
that the newspapers in this period provided ample space for an open 
public discussion also on this issue.
A large proportion of the non-editorial sources represent the 
elite strata of society. As much as 83% of the contributors are either 
journalists, politicians, academics, represent organisations, pundits, 
high-level professionals or established writers in the public domain. It 
seems as if the post 22 July debate on this specific term is even more 
academic in its nature than other debates due to the mere concept in 
question. Men constitute 72% of the voices registered in the articles. 
This confirms the male dominance in the public debate, both in the 
columns and as sources in news stories. Actors with ethnic minority 
background represent 13.5% of the voices, and less than half of 
these are women.
4.1    The harmony discourse
One of the most prominent features of this debate appears to be a 
discourse advocating bridge building, more precisely formulated as 
discourse of cohesion and harmony, linked with the policy-definition 
of multiculturalism. The core of this discourse highlights an often 
occurring pattern throughout the post-terror coverage. First, we find 
an appreciation for the government and political leaders for coping 
with the situation in a mature and exemplary way, highlighting the 
Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg as a great and successful leader 
(according to the terrorist responsible for the “multiculturalist politics” 
in Norway). The following quotes exemplify this trend: “During the 
last few weeks I’ve reflected and been thinking, this is my country, 
and I’m so proud of it …” writes an anthropologist (Klassekampen, 
5.08.2011). And an editorial in the Norwegian business paper 
phrases this: “The rest [in addition to the Prime Minister] of the 
political leadership has also shown itself from its best side, and 
contributed to cohesion, not division. No one has tried to exploit 
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the tragic events to attack opponents or score political capital” 
(Dagens Næringsliv 27.07.2011).
Related is a coming-to-terms with the Norwegian society and 
its values. Many expressions published during these first 100 days 
discuss the term multiculturalism in a rather diplomatic way. People 
supportive of this or related concepts are in our period of analysis 
not much subjected to harsh examination. “Diversity is the answer”; 
a header from an article quoted below summarises this view towards 
multiculturalism: 
A successful society is not just about how resources are allocated, 
but about recognition. It entails that societies, which include 
broadly and do not distinguish sharply between “insiders” and 
“outsiders” are successful societies. It’s good to have structures 
in the society, which safeguard multiculturalism, and which allow 
immigrants not only to be integrated through education, work 
and so on, but which also let them preserve their own culture 
(Klassekampen 6.08.2011).
The discussions in the national press carefully approach the 
concept so fiercely attacked by the 22 July terrorist, and thereby 
often apply multicultural(ism) as a descriptive term when they 
counter his world views. Building bridges between groups of 
diverse backgrounds enhances Norway’s reputation, which was 
contaminated by the terrorist’s misdeeds. Primary contributors in this 
discourse are journalists, academics and grass roots citizens. This 
discourse of cohesion and harmony advocating caution relates to the 
discourse of responsibility in practicing free expression.
4.2    The explanatory model
Another main discourse revealed through the items addressing 
multiculturalism is the explanatory model. Contributors try to uncover 
the driving forces behind the terrorist acts. A number of articles refer 
to the parts of ABB’s Manifesto, where fear of multiculturalism and 
Islam is presented as the primary explanation for the terror attack. 
According to this publication, Breivik quit his political work against 
Islam and multiculturalism in 2002.11 He writes that armed struggle 
seems to be the only fruitful way (BergensTidende, 24.07.2011). 
Pundits, who counter this explanation, emphasise the importance of 
the debate being broad-based: media should include all voices, also 
minority nationalist and adherers to multiculturalism.
Norwegian author Cornelius Jakhelln writes about his inner 
“terror-virus” which he claims is latent in every human being. The 
“virus” infected him through his stay in a multicultural Parisian 
neighbourhood. According to Jakhelln, mocking, discrimination and 
exclusion from his multicultural neighbours started this “infection”. He 
relates his own anger to the anger the terrorist must have felt. But 
instead of resorting to violent behaviour, Jakhelln got to express his 
feelings through poetry and writing (Fædrelandsvennen, 25.07.2011, 
Morgenbladet 29.07.2011). He underlines the importance of giving 
space to alternative views on multiculturalism to avoid the rage from 
turning violent and thus gives voice to the pressure cooker discourse.
Thus, throughout the first 100 days we register not only a 
cautious, discourse of cohesion and harmony (defending diversity) 
in the national press but also items related to the pressure cooker 
discourse. An underlying explanatory discourse may be identified, 
claiming that views critical of multiculturalism have been gagged 
by political correctness; thus, extremism flourishes among special 
elements in the Norwegian society. The positions concerning 
victimhood and responsibility for the terror are wide apart. But 
concerning multiculturalism, those who defend diversity adhere 
mostly to the lived diversity and policy definitions of multiculturalism; 
whereas the critical or more spiteful ones see the concept partly as 
misguided policy and partly as misleading ideology.
4.3    What lessons to be drawn?
The debate following the chronicle “Unacceptable expressions” (see 
above) was one of the first occurring in the mainstream press after 
the terror. Another smaller debate started later, with an initial opinion 
piece from the editor of the web journal HonestThinking.org, this 
item also published in Aftenposten: “As long as we do not realise 
that Behring Breivik, in spite of his violence-appraising ideology and 
utopian visions, has a [valid] point, we cut ourselves off from one 
of the most important lessons to be drawn after the catastrophe 
this summer” (Aftenposten 13.10.2011). This editor, Ole Jørgen 
Anfindsen, known for his harsh views on Islam and immigration, 
Table 3. National press: 22 Juli and “multikult*”: distribution per week. Source: Retriever search engine, 23.7.2011 to 31.10.2011, all national newspapers. 
              The vertical dimension shows the number of articles, and the horizontal one the week number.
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realised that the terrorist might have been inspired by some of his 
own writings. He claims that he has grieved with the grievers and 
promises to scale down his rhetoric. He redefines “echo chambers” 
(see above), as sheltering the elite of the Norwegian society. 
Anfindsen asks if these chambers are only found among the critics of 
migration: in the “multicultural echo chamber such warnings [against 
negative consequences of migration] and counter arguments are 
not welcome; they are often rejected as intolerant”. He also refers 
to people operating within these “echo chambers” as likely to slowly 
destroy the confidence needed between “the people and the ruling 
in a functioning democracy.” Thus, he promotes one of the above-
mentioned anti-elitist discourses where the “people” is positioned 
as victim. To support his claim, he writes that for “many years we 
have seen that a number of nationally opinionated people do their 
utmost to prevent a broad-based, open debate on all sides of the 
problem”. In this combination of anti-elite and victim discourse, the 
deviant (here groups and individuals critical or hateful of migration) is 
represented as suffering from the elite’s arrogance.
Anfindsen had two direct responses to his opinion piece within 
the time frame of our material. Both were published in the same 
newspaper, the first one from Labour MOP Hadia Tajik. She attacks 
his views through suggestive parallelisms:
The question forcing itself to the forefront is: If Breivik “has a 
point”, does this imply that also Al-Qaida in-between all their 
glorification of violence “has a point”? Or does Anfindsen realize 
that the analyses behind the terror are so shaky that they need 
machine guns as crutches? (Aftenposten 17.10.2011).
Tajik rejects Anfindsen’s claims of Norway being subject to mass 
immigration and writes that only about 500,000 persons who have 
migrated, actually live in Norway, and more than half of them are from 
European countries. Furthermore, she refers to his views on “Islamic 
cultures” as rooted in a rather literal interpretation of the Quran. 
And she comments: “Ironically, he thus becomes a flag bearer for 
the Islamists. They think that one has to interpret the Quran literally 
to be a Muslim. Anfindsen seems to be of the same opinion”. Tajik 
also points to the fact that Anfindsen has had access to a range of 
Norwegian newspapers, and that his last book (Anfindsen 2010) 
received support from the Norwegian Free Expression foundation, 
thus claiming him being accepted as worthy of publishing.
The other article refers to Anfindsen’s claim of being victimised 
by “politicians, researchers, bureaucrats, media people and other 
people from the elite of [our] society” and these people hindering a 
broad and open debate. This writer describes the rhetoric as being 
less careful in Internet debates, where the “victim” position due to the 
elite conspiracy is more explicit.
The conspiracy’ against critics of immigration is in this case 
very inefficient. The immigration and asylum policy has become 
increasingly strict during the last 10 years. […] Critics of 
immigration and Islam have all reasons to celebrate. […] But 
opponents to immigration seem to feel more marginalized than 
ever. Anfindsen sympathizes with the Utøya-terrorist’s feeling: 
‘our whole system is false’ and demand self-reflexion from ‘the 
architects behind’ (Aftenposten 18.10.2011).
This writer alleges that Norwegian editors are struck by a 
“collective Stockholm-syndrome of sorts” since they know that they 
are not part of a conspiracy against critics of migration. “Still they bow 
down to this rhetoric and underline the allegations about censorship 
and gagging, out of fear for being seen as enemies of freedom of 
expression” (Aftenposten 18.10.2011). This writer suggests an 
editorial fear for not being seen as proponents of liberal freedom of 
expression.
5    Conclusion
Through our analysis, we have demonstrated the interrelatedness 
between some of the main discourses identified. Many of the 
newspaper items aim (explicitly or implicitly) at explaining the 22 July 
terror, but in very different ways. While some do see the Norwegian 
society with its diversity as basically sound (descriptive or policy-
related multiculturalism) but threatened by offensive and hateful 
rhetoric which may ultimately stimulate violence (the responsibility 
discourse), others focus on Norwegian exclusionary political 
correctness and naïve positions when it comes to the “dangers of 
multiculturalism” (ideological) as responsible for hate speech and 
violence (the pressure cooker discourse). We find practically no 
traces of the extreme cultural relativist view that is targeted by writers 
who remain critical to the current diversity politics. On the other hand, 
media seem to open up more for writers with some kind of political 
relations to Anders Behring Breivik, such as the editors of document.
no and HonestThinking.org. This may be due to a presupposition of 
these groups as marginalised and thus in need of representation to 
avoid the “lid blowing off”.
The competing discourses on these particular topics are rooted in 
deep political conflicts, known in other European countries, but may 
perhaps also be explained by media competition, since a medium 
favourably inclined to accommodate all kinds of expressions may 
be associated with strong cultural capital. And in addition to media’s 
explicit self-images as guardians of free expression, the debate 
occurs in an era of intensified competition for online readership 
and ad revenue. A relevant question is whether the “competition” 
related to being the best guardian of free speech may background 
another discussion, i.e. on how to develop a society in which racism, 
discrimination and racist-motivated terror do not threaten people’s 
lives and livelihood.
From the debates and coverage analysed, there seems to be 
no clear-cut consensus in Norway about the need to work towards 
such a society, since the diagnoses of the current situation differ 
substantially. The post 22 July discourses in the nation-wide press are 
dominated by elite participants, but elite participation in mainstream 
media is nothing new. But these media increasingly compete with 
web-based options for those who want to air their views, and where 
non-elite persons have more access. More research is needed to 
explore the unofficial “ranking” of media in first category (mainstream 
print newspapers, main TV channels), second (popular debates 
linked to mainstream media websites) and third category (weblogs, 
Facebook groups and “echo chamber” spaces). Furthermore, we 
need to question whether such an informal ranking may still produce 
feelings of being excluded from the larger society and being relegated 
to the “undergrowth” of social media. As John Steel argues, “The 
capacity that a person has to air his or her views on a blog is of 
course significantly different to that of a corporate news organization” 
(Steel 2012: 4). Further research also needs to address the different 
streams of online and social media and their variety of functions to 
be able to understand more profoundly the history of the post-22 July 
media debates.
The post 22 July coverage related to vital concepts for the 
democratic and social development of our society may be interpreted 
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in two ways: both as a sound proof of Norwegian openness and 
diversity of opinion; and as an indicator of a trend towards frozen 
victim positions and discourses leading towards less caution for the 
vulnerable who fear more discrimination and hatred. The “clash of 
definitions” (to paraphrase Said, 2003) is bound to develop further 
while Norway continues to heal her wounds.
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Notes
For more on this issue, look at the report from Antirasistisk 
Senter: “Om trakassering av muslimer og innvandrere etter 
eksplosjonen i regjeringskvartalet 22.07.2011. http://www.
antirasistisk-senter.no/publikasjoner.5076758.html [accessed 
16.8.2012].
See the commission report: http://22julikommisjonen.no/
Rapport Accessed 29.1.2013.
Last verdict under this article was passed in 2007, against Tore 
Tvedt from “Boot Boys” for racist expressions against Jews.
Document.no is a website where hostility to Islam and support 
for the state of Israel are important pillars. Their self-presentation 
is as a site where journalists from Norway and other countries 
write about current topics, especially concerning international 
politics. They claim to be the first journalistic website using the 
weblog as a format (since 2003). Source: http://www.document.
no/om/.
In July 2012, a right-wing extremist, antifeminist blogger 
threatened to kill a policeman on his highly controversial blog. 
He was arrested and accused for incitements of violence. 
Despite the fact that incitements of violence is illegal, and 
that he is considered a public figure publishing on a public 
blog, the Supreme Court ruled in his favour, due to the threat 
being published on the Internet and not in mainstream media. 
In his new year speech, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg said: 
“And nobody should [be allowed] to threaten others without 
consequences. Therefore, the government wants hateful 
expressions on the net to be punished. This spring we will 
suggest a proposition about this to the Parliament.” Source: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/smk/aktuelt/taler_og_
artikler/statsministeren/statsminister_jens_stoltenberg/2013/
statsministerens-nyttarstale-2013.html?id=710868 [accessed 
20.1.2013].
After scrutiny, the number turned out to be smaller, but this 
table, generated by the research engine, shows the downsliding 
trend when it comes to numbers.
This category is not always easy to distinguish, but these voices 
were mostly individuals known from before by their participation 
in the public sphere, and belong to the category as either 
migrated to Norway or having parents who have done so [this 
in accordance with the categories used by Statistics Norway 
(SSB)].
The last 8% are contributions where the author is unknown 
(mainly editorials).
Most often the adherents to this discourse do not mention the 
concept “self-censorship”.
Defined by “The Free Dictionary” as follows: “educated people 
who like to discuss and give their opinions about political and 
social matters”. Source: http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/
the+chattering+classes [accessed 29.01.2013].
Breivik was a member of the FrP (“Party of Progress”) or its 
Youth organization from 1997 to 2007; thus, this information 
partly contradicts his own. Source: http://www.aftenposten.no/
nyheter/iriks/Frp-Breivik-har-vart-medlem-og-har-hatt-verv-i-
ungdomspartiet-5014741.html [accessed 20.1.2013].
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